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ABSTRACT 
 
The Hong Kong construction industry is lauded for its “can-do” attitude and the apparently 
high levels of integration and cooperation that enables its high level of performance. An 
industry that can regularly complete four day floor cycles on high rise buildings over 40 
storeys should be an innovative and relationship based industry. However, this is not the 
case. For example`, the predominant form of procurement in Hong Kong is still design-bid-
build (the “traditional” approach) and “partnering” has been introduced into the industry but in 
a piece-meal fashion and in a manner which is hardly effective. Still, the industry is 
characterised by hierarchy, tradition and procedures but the industry is also heavily influenced 
by the Chinese culture in which it was situated. Hence, values such as face, harmony and 
conflict avoidance are also embedded in the industry culture. In such a situation, the issue of 
stakeholders and their management has been paid scant regard; the government was used to 
making decisions on development rather than consulting widely and the other major players, 
the oligarchy of large property developers, adopted a simple, economic approach to their 
business plans and only over the past few years have issues such as corporate social 
responsibility reached their boardrooms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In Hong Kong, large-scale infrastructure projects are often delivered by joint ventures of 
international and local construction firms (Walker and Johannes, 2003). Similar trends have 
also been observed in mainland China (Chan and Suen, 2005; Gale and Luo, 2004). For this 
type of international joint venture (IJV), at least one partner of the venture is headquartered 
outside the country where the construction project is undertaken (cf. Geringer and Hebert, 
1989, cited in Ozorhon et al., 2008). Notwithstanding the advantages of engaging in the IJV, 
due to the inherent complexity of IJVs which stems largely from a multi-cultural mix of nations, 
organisations, and their participants, IJVs are frequently mired with instability and poor 
performance (Parkhe, 1993). 
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In this context, the effective use of stakeholder management and relationship management 
can be said to be in their infancy in Hong Kong and China and in some ways run counter to 
the ethos and philosophy of an industry where speed and money are king. However, Hong 
Kong people have become much more demanding of their government and institutions and 
have demanded that they be consulted and involved in all major and minor developments 
(e.g. the Central-Wanchai reclamation, the new government offices). Indeed, during the 
Handover period Hong Kong people took to the streets demanding freedom and democracy 
and those demands continue to this day as political reform has come slowly to the colonial 
and post-colonial systems. 
 
Having briefly set this scene we present below two case studies, one a civil engineering 
project and the other a public housing project, which draw out a number of the themes alluded 
to above by way of example. We then attempt to draw together some generalisations on how 
stakeholder and relationship management are enacted in Hong Kong, identifying drivers and 
inhibitors to their successful implementation, and noting the impact of history, tradition and 
culture on how they are implemented and used in Hong Kong. We conclude with the assertion 
that stakeholder management and relationship management must be implemented in a 
context specific manner to be effective. 
 
STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 
Project stakeholders are a person or group of people who have a vested interest in the 
success or failure of a project and the environment within which the project operates 
(Olander, 2007, p. 278). Vested interest, in turn, can be viewed as the actual or perceived 
benefits or risks/harms from the activities of construction project management (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). The project stakeholders may have a positive or a negative influence on 
the project. The challenge for the project team, hence, becomes one of implementing the 
project strategies such that positive stakeholder’s influence is maximized and negative 
influence is minimized (Walker et al., 2008). In analyzing stakeholder management activities, 
it is useful to categorise stakeholders into two broad groups –primary and secondary 
stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are people or groups that have a legal contractual 
relationship to the project. Secondary stakeholders, on the other hand, are those who 
influence or are influenced by the project but are otherwise not regularly engaged in 
transactions with the project (Cleland and Ireland, 2007, p. 151). It is apparent that the client; 
the main and subcontractors; the quantity surveyor; suppliers and the like belong to the 
former group while local communities and general public the latter.  
 
RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 
Partnering, alliancing and relationship management require a change of mind set – a culture 
change – and the client side must change along with the contracting side.  A fit is required 
between organisational structure and culture.  Relationship contracting has the potential 
benefits of achieving stakeholder empowerment, facilitating regional development and 
delivering a sustainable industry.  A change based on a sound understanding of underlying 
culture and attitudes is required for successful implementation of relationship management 
approaches.  The change must be directed towards developing attitudes and a culture that 
are supportive of relationship management. 
 
 
Figure 1: Change of “mind set” 
BACKGROUND 
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The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government has embraced the world 
wide trend of sustainable development. Consequently, in the development front, the HKSAR 
government has emphasized sustainability and community development in procuring and 
implementing construction projects. Four sustainability dimensions have been adopted by the 
government when administering construction projects. These dimensions focus on 
economics, environment, society, and resource utilization. The client of the project A 
implemented the four dimensions in all aspects of the procurement and the administration of 
the project. The thrust is based on sustainable construction, the aim of which is to 
progressively achieve sustainable development in public housing. The efforts are that of 
balancing the economic, social, and environmental concerns of all the stakeholders in the 
project. To achieve these goals, various issues are embedded in the tendering and 
contracting procedures in the implementation of the project. 
 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION – Case A 
Bearing in mind the foregoing discussion we now describe the context of project A. The 
economic dimension focuses on attainment of cost effectiveness of the project. Cost 
effectiveness is critical for economic sustainability because all aspects of the housing 
development, construction, through to operation and maintenance impact on the budget. 
Public funds are at stake. The environmental dimension concerns the maintenance or 
betterment of the environment where the development is located. Construction activities have 
to be undertaken such that the impacts to the surrounding residents and community are kept 
to a minimum. Better construction methods and the use of more environmentally friendly 
construction materials are two strategies to achieve these objectives. Resource utilisation is 
related to the environmental dimension. The main thrust is to properly manage and reduce 
the consumption of resources in the construction processes. The production of waste and the 
use of energy are the two main areas of concerns. The social dimension is grounded in the 
client’s belief that public housing and its development and construction have to promote social 
stability, economic prosperity, and foster social cohesion. In the construction of the project, 
the client strives to provide a model working environment for those working on the site. As will 
become apparent, these dimensions are variously manifested in the procurement and 
stakeholder management of the project. 
 
The project presented is one government project administered under such a backdrop. The 
project involves the construction of a public rental housing estate. Three 41-storey blocks are 
to be built. Each block measures approximately 50 x 34 metres on plan. The blocks are 
approximately 117 metres high from the ground floor to the main roof level. The three blocks 
consist of over 2300 rental domestic flat units of various types and sizes. Apart from these 
building works, there are also some civil engineering works. These works include excavation, 
filling, disposal, lateral support works for the raft foundations, and pilecap works for the three 
domestic blocks. The housing estate will be served by a neighbourhood elderly centre.  
 
The client has adopted innovative procurement initiatives for the project with six Guaranteed 
Maximum Price (GMP) packages allowing design leverage and buildability scope on the part 
of the main and sub-contractors. In addition, several contractual initiatives have also been 
pioneered in the project. It is under these innovative initiatives that various stakeholders of the 
project are engaged. All works for the project were contracted via the traditional approach but 
special conditions were added to the contract for the six GMP work packages. The majority of 
the packages were design and build but the building services packages (i.e. the plumbing, 
electrical, and fire services) involve only installation works with design provided by the client. 
These packages collectively represent some 30% of the project cost.   
 
The procurement method is essentially a risk-reduced model developed from the private 
sector approach to target cost and GMP contracting. The procurement approach enables the 
client to potentially reduce claims, integrate the diverse interests of a complex construction 
project, offers the contractor an incentive to provide value added services by assimilating the 
contractor’s expertise in the design and innovations in construction methods and materials to 
enhance buildability (Chan et al., 2007). For the latter consideration, the contractor is 
rewarded for his creativity and improvement efforts on the design and construction of the 
works.  
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Constructive engagement was implemented throughout the supply chain from the primary 
project stakeholders (the project team, the client, the subcontractors and suppliers), and 
secondary stakeholders (the community) in the project. These initiatives target each 
stakeholder’s main concerns and attempt to match them. The avenues used in this aspect 
include shared saving among the main stakeholders of the client, main contractor, and 
subcontractors; ensuring community benefits through various schemes administered by the 
main and sub-contractors endorsed by the client; ensuring workforce benefits and welfare; 
and project team members human resource development. From the perspective of 
stakeholder management, the two salient thrusts in driving these initiatives are client 
proactiveness and farsightedness, and the main contractor “coming-of-age” corporate social 
responsibility awareness and its manifestations. 
 
Unlike the traditional GMP scheme whereby the sharing arrangement is only limited to the 
gain (Chan et al., 2007), both the “pain and gain” are shared for the project. The cost saving 
for GMP packages is shared equally between the client and the main contractor, i.e. 
50%:50%. However, the contractor is only entitled to 15% of his portion of the saving. The 
remaining 85% is to be shared between the contractor and the GMP subcontractor(s) on a 
pro-rata basis based on the contribution to net savings by both parties. This arrangement 
potentially motivates both the main and subcontractor(s). The project dispute resolution 
system is implemented to resolve disputes that might arise at source. Clearly, a collaborative 
environment is fundamental in smoothing project works. As with most of the government 
projects, team spirit of the project is developed through a partnering approach. While minor 
disagreements were present, generally it was observed that better communication and 
understanding were achieved among the main contractor and client teams. Informal 
“workshops” convened by the project architect especially at the beginning stage of the project 
were particularly effective in promoting cooperation among various parties. Although originally 
intended to solve technical problems, the constant contacts of participants throughout the 
workshop sessions had produced a “side effect” of improving relationships due to close and 
frequent contacts. 
 
It is apparent that all the activities cannot be smoothly rolled out without active participation of 
the main contractor. In what appears to be the response to the client’s push for active 
community engagement at the beginning, the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
has gradually evolved throughout the organization of the main contractor over time. As a 
result of the increased awareness on the impact of their activities on the community, the 
contractor has been active in participating and responding to the client’s drive for community 
engagement, at times, going beyond the requirements of the client. Two incidents exemplify 
the contractor’s active involvement. The first involves contractor’s volunteer house 
improvement activities during a festival to help the elderly residents at the nearby estate. The 
main contractor dispatched two teams of personnel to help repair malfunctioning services 
within the flats of elderly residents. The second concerns the main contractor volunteering 
construction related information to the nearby residents in terms of prolonging construction 
activities beyond normal working hours (i.e. 7.00pm). The improved communication between 
the project team (both the client and main contractor teams) and the community resulted in 
reduced complaints and a more positive impression from the residents.  
 
IMPLICATIONS  
Passive reaction among the subcontractors and junior staff members. The passive reaction 
refers mainly to the initiation and participation of the parties in the implementation of 
stakeholder management. The situation is particularly evident in the management of 
secondary stakeholders. For the project, initiation of stakeholder management is mainly 
driven by the management of the client and the main contractor. Little effort came from the 
lower echelon of the project organisation. The contribution from this hierarchy of members 
comes mainly in the form of carrying out instructions from their supervisors/managers. It 
appears, therefore, that the members of the lower echelon are adopting a minimalist 
approach. For the members, engaging with the external stakeholder does not readily 
contribute to their immediate works. As both the main contractor and the client are fully 
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committed to the stakeholder management paradigm, the issue is one of engaging the lower 
echelon of the project organisation so that a uniform and positive attitude can be inculcated.  
 
The lack of a structured approach to project stakeholder management. The preceding 
observation is symptomatic of the present issue of the lack of a structured project stakeholder 
management system on the part of the main contractor. The deficiency is particularly acute 
with external stakeholder management. Despite considerable success in dealing with and 
tackling issues with the community, the main contractor admitted that their approach was one 
of trial-and-error and experimentation. Most of the stakeholder management initiatives rolled 
out in the project were implemented for the first time, at times without thorough deliberation. 
For the main contractor, while there are elaborate procedures and guidelines dealing with the 
internal stakeholders, the guidelines for managing external stakeholders, especially the 
communal stakeholders (e.g. surrounding residents, property and estate management 
agency, and district councilors) had not been established. In particular, there was no 
structured approach to identify external stakeholders, their impacts, and the method of 
engaging them, yet methodologies currently exist for their identification and management 
(see, for example, Walker, Bourne & Rowlinson 2008). The main contractor appears to be 
passive in  taking the cue from the client. While the efforts and achievement of the main 
contractor have to be commended, the situation reflects the somehow parochial mentality of 
the construction fraternity in terms of external stakeholder management.  
 
No allowance for additional resources for stakeholder management. Despite the various 
external stakeholder management activities that had been carried out by the main contractor, 
there was no provision of additional resources available for the main contractor under the 
contract. The reward from the client comes in the form of recognition. Both the client and the 
main contractor are fully committed to making the project a success in most if not all aspects. 
In addition, given its status as a pilot project the ensuing image issues and the high stakes 
involved especially for the two primary stakeholders of the client and main contractor (Mahesh 
et al., 2007), the main contractor resorted to adsorbing the extra costs. However, while the 
costs involved in carrying out those activities are not considerably large, the lack of 
compensation from the client may lead to only token efforts from the main contractor.  
 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION - Case B 
The project is an infrastructure project, comprising a 1.1km elevated viaduct dual three-lane 
carriageway (average 65m above ground) connecting a tunnel (under construction) on one 
end, to a cable-stayed bridge (under construction) at the other end.  Together, they form an 
integral part of a 7.6 km long major highway. The project site is reclaimed land (to be handed 
over in phases) surrounded by industrial facilities, container terminals and an educational 
institution. The contract is a re-measurement type, traditional design-bid-build approach, with 
an initial contract period of 40 months. There is also a non-contractual partnering 
arrangement in place. The client is a major works department of the Government of Hong 
Kong and the contractor is a joint venture between a Hong Kong-based French company and 
a Chinese state-owned company. The consulting Engineer is a Hong Kong-based 
international engineering consulting firm. 
 
The peculiar features of this project, especially its size, location (vertically and laterally) and 
technical complexity, brought together a myriad of stakeholders, whose interests needed to 
be aligned at various phases to successfully deliver the project. Incidents involving critical and 
contentious issues during the construction phase of the project, are used to illustrate how the 
stakeholders surrounding each incident were identified, managed or mismanaged individually 
and collectively in resolving the various issues, as in case A. The impact of the procurement 
arrangement on the configuration of the project stakeholders and the implications for their 
management are also discussed. 
 
INTERFACE ARRANGEMENT 
The contractor proposed sometime after the commencement of the project to change the 
nature of the original arrangement regarding the use of the deck of an adjoining bridge project 
(under construction), as a platform to station a launching girder in order to manoeuvre and 
launch viaduct segments. The proposed change was to position the launching girder beyond 
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the point originally proposed in their Technical Proposal at tender and which was 
subsequently built into the contract as an interface arrangement. From the contractor’s 
perspective however, the change was necessary to make the launching operation simpler and 
safer. Yet, given the significant shift from the original plan, the new proposal had various 
implications for progress and risks. In particular, late resolution of the issue could jeopardize 
the achievement of the project Key Dates. To resolve this issue however the input and buy-in 
of a host of stakeholders was required.  The stakeholders in this incident comprised the 
following, both internal and external to the viaduct project organisation; 
-­‐ The Client (same for both projects) 
-­‐ Viaduct Contractor (viaduct  JV contractor) 
-­‐ Independent Checking Engineer (ICE) 
-­‐ Bridge Contractor (bridge JV contractor) 
-­‐ Engineer’s Representative ( viaduct project) 
-­‐ Engineer’s Representative ( bridge project) 
-­‐ The Engineer (viaduct project) 
-­‐ The Engineer (bridge project) 
-­‐ Project Board of Directors (Viaduct JV Contractor)  
-­‐ Project Board of Directors (Bridge JV Contractor) 
 
A number of critical and contentious issues regarding the new proposal were apparent; 
-­‐ The structural stability of the bridge deck to withstand the imposed loads beyond the 
original point needed to be established 
-­‐ Cast-in items were required on the pier and bridge deck to facilitate the positioning of 
the launching girder 
-­‐ Partial removal of some of the temporary supports to the bridge deck was required to 
avoid collision with parts of the launching girder 
-­‐ The works programme could be derailed if the issue was not resolved in a timely 
manner, jeopardizing the achievement of Key Dates 
-­‐ Responsibility for the risk and liability for any unforeseen circumstances regarding the 
proposed operations needed to be established 
-­‐ Associated cost and time liability needed to be established 
-­‐  
It was therefore the contractor’s responsibility to obtain buy-in of the various stakeholders 
identified above to resolve all of the above issues of contention. In doing so, the stakeholders 
were engaged both formally and informally. For example, the issues regarding the structural 
stability, partial removal of temporary supports and  cast-in items, which were within the 
domain of the Bridge Contractor, were discussed in the first instance at their regular monthly 
interface meeting. At this meeting the Bridge Contractor agreed in principle to check the 
feasibility of the issues raised and to give its response.  
 
While the first three issues, which were technical in nature, were easier to resolve with the 
Bridge Contractor, the last three, which were contractual, were most problematic.  In terms of 
risk and liability regarding damage to the bride deck works, this was covered under an Owner 
Controlled Insurance Programme (OCIP) taken by the client to cover all the projects within the 
7.6km highway. The contentious issue was however with potential claims from either 
contractor for extension of time and associated cost due to any unforeseen prolongation 
arising from the proposed arrangement. It became significantly more contentious when the 
client requested that the Engineers of both projects get undertakings from their respective 
contractors not to claim time or costs associated with the proposal if approval was granted. 
Apparently, a similar arrangement on one of the client’s previous projects had resulted in 
huge prolongation claims from one of the contractors and thus reinforced the ‘baggage’ 
parties carry from one project to the other.  
 
To obtain buy-in of all parties regarding the viability of their proposal, the Viaduct Contractor 
organized and delivered a presentation on the sequences involved in their new proposal 
regarding the use of the bridge deck. Yet, this did little to persuade the parties to shift their 
positions. The client maintained his position of no approval without waiver of rights to claim 
time and associated cost by the contractors. The contractors also maintained that they could 
not waive that right. While this was generally a contractual matter, it also highlights the 
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cultural disposition of uncertainty avoidance in a Chinese work context and the tendency to 
work strictly according to the rules (or contract in this case). Not even the double assurance 
provided by the use of the Independent Checking Engineer to provide an independent 
assessment of the safety and structural soundness of the proposal could persuade the parties 
to reach an agreement.  
 
To put an end to the “ping-pong letters” that were becoming the main mode of communication 
regarding this issue, a meeting was then scheduled to specifically deal with the issue. 
However, as the issue could not be resolved, the contractor was requested to revert to the 
original sequence of segment erection in the technical proposal at tender or submit alternative 
proposals for consideration. Out of options and running out of time as well, the contractor 
agreed to revert to the original proposal and thus prepared and submitted a proposal to the 
ER accordingly. This proposal included a method statement, risk assessment, detailed 
interface arrangement and various ICE certificates as required. This was approved by the ER. 
As this was also the outstanding issue making it impossible to have the revised programme of 
works approved, the contractor also prepared and submitted the programme in line with the 
original arrangement.  
 
Evidently, about six months was spent needlessly, only to revert to the original proposal. 
Ironically, the segment launching operation which was the subject of about 6 months back 
and forth discussion and “ping-pong letters” actually took less than 3 weeks to complete after 
reverting to the original plan. It is interesting also that the various stakeholders in this, 
especially the client, took positions that appeared at variance with the spirit of the non-
contractual partnering that was in place on the project and that was continuously reinforced 
through various workshops. Indeed, an attempt to use the partnering process to resolve this 
issue was met with silence from all parties, reinforcing the sceptics’ belief that many parties 
who sign-up to such non-contractual partnering arrangements have little commitment to 
working in “real” partnership. One of the client’s team members was particularly unequivocal 
when he put it rather bluntly in an interview that; 
“Under the partnering spirit, we organize ……..workshops and………..discussions with 
facilitator where we can express our opinion, ….. but still the roles of the engineer, the 
employer and the contractor are still clear under the contract.  
 
MISCAST SEGMENTS 
67 pre-cast viaduct segments were miscast by the pre-cast subcontractor due to wrong 
setting-out information provided. This resulted in the incorporation of cross-falls in the wrong 
direction. The ER subsequently issued a non-conformity notice which required that the 
segments be scrapped and recast. In view of the significant and unrecoverable delay to the 
work that this error could cause, there was the urgent need to review the procedures relating 
to the production of the precast segments in the precast yard in Mainland China, by 
strengthening supervision. There was therefore an immediate review of the setting out and 
checking procedures for the production of the precast segments.  
The stakeholders in this case included; 
-­‐ Pre-cast Sub-contractor (in Mainland China) 
-­‐ Contractor (Viaduct) 
-­‐ Independent Engineering Consultant 
-­‐ The Client 
-­‐ Client’s Maintenance Unit 
-­‐ Clients Audit Team 
-­‐ Government Department (in charge of waste disposal site) 
-­‐ The Engineer 
-­‐ The Engineer’s Representative (ER) 
 
When the error was detected, some of the wrongly cast segments were already erected. The 
consequence of the errors in the already erected segments was that the alignment of the 
finished road surface was unlikely to meet the requirements in the specifications. This 
therefore required that the approval of the client’s maintenance unit and the transport 
department be sought for the acceptance of those works. Given the implications of the lost 
production time had for the progress of the works, the contractor further proposed 
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incorporating as many of the miscast segments as possible into the works since the errors 
had no implications for the structural capacity of the viaduct. In line with this a full report on 
the segment errors was prepared and submitted to the ER so that the feasibility of further 
incorporating as many of the miscast segments (without rectification) into the works could be 
evaluated. The miscast errors were also picked up by the client’s technical audit team 
following their prevention of substandard works audit and called for rectification.  
While some segments were redeemed and incorporated into the works, about 35 miscast 
segments became redundant and needed to be discarded.  However, the mode of disposal 
became another issue. The client proposed that the contractor could consider sinking the 
miscast segments to the seabed to form an artificial reef. The client however left it to the 
contractor to decide on his preferred method of disposing of the miscast segments and with a 
promise to assist as required.  The contractor eventually decided to have them demolished. 
To facilitate their gaining consent to demolish the miscast segments at a waste disposal site 
from the government department in charge, the contractor requested the client to provide 
them with a support letter. The client agreed and provided them a letter supporting their 
proposal. The government department in charge however rejected the contractor’s proposal 
to demolish the miscast segments at the waste disposal site and noted that the contractor can 
have them demolished in China where they are still stored in the precast yard.  
 
It is clear here that, the consequence of the miscast error for all stakeholders was an 
incentive to work together for a fruitful resolution of the issue. This demonstrates the power of 
joint-interest or joint-risk in motivating stakeholders to work for the common good of the 
project. Yet, the inability to agree on how to dispose of the remaining precast segments also 
shows how lack of alignment of interests forestalls consensus building. 
 
IMPACT OF PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENT 
This project was procured under a traditional design-bid-build approach. As the most common 
procurement arrangement in Hong Kong, it presupposes that the parties were generally 
familiar with the procurement route. Yet, it is apparent from the discussion so far that the 
arms-length mindset associated with this approach contributed to how some of the incidents 
played out. It is however commendable that the interface arrangements were built into the 
contract. This approach clearly defined the interdependence between the two projects from 
the onset as an issue to be managed during the project. However, the interface arrangement 
appears to have been structured without consideration for the uncertainties that can arise in a 
project of this size and complexity. This was further exacerbated by the inflexibility of the 
various parties. Ironically, there was a non-contractual partnering arrangement in place, in 
which the parties promised to work in partnership. Yet, when it mattered most all the 
stakeholders held on to their contractual rights.  
 
The structuring of the project organisation also had implications for the number of 
stakeholders on any issue and thus their management. First, the client organisation was a 
plural one. On many issues three or more different departments of the client organisation 
needed to be satisfied, and this became more problematic when they disagreed. The fact that 
the contractors on the two adjoining projects were joint ventures also had implications for 
engaging them.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
The incidents have been analysed above to show how stakeholder management on a Hong 
Kong infrastructure projects manifested itself. The different incidents showed management of 
relationships among stakeholders internal to the project organisation as well as relationships 
among stakeholders external to the project. In both cases it was clear that when the stake for 
all stakeholders on the issue of contention was high there was a tendency to reach an 
agreement easily. Culture specific dynamics also manifested themselves in the positions 
different stakeholders took on issues and there was a general tendency for rule following or 
adherence strictly to the contract. This may be attributable to the fear of blame culture 
pervasive in public project settings and the conflict avoiding view inherent in the Confucian 
value system. 
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Taken together however, this case study demonstrates an element of progress towards public 
engagement on projects in Hong Kong, an element which was unheard of a decade ago. Yet, 
the arms-length mindset, perpetuated by decades of use of the traditional procurement 
arrangement is still prevalent. Indeed, when collaborative initiatives such as partnering are 
bolted onto the traditional procurement system little evidence of real partnership is 
manifested. Thus, a shift in culture, both in terms of the way stakeholders are engaged and 
projects are procured appears a viable option for project delivery in Hong Kong. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
It is apparent from the case studies above that tradition, custom and practice, politics and 
culture have a major influence on how stakeholder management is undertaken in the Hong 
Kong construction industry. Without a strong tradition of democracy it is not surprising that the 
move to draw the public, green groups and other parties into the development process has 
moved forward slowly; there is no evidence of resistance to change, rather an inertia 
grounded in the traditional values of society and the structure of government departments and 
institutions which puts a brake on change. This is not totally surprising: if one studies the 
position of Hong Kong on Hofstede’s dimensions of culture it is obvious that nations such as 
UK and USA have a value infrastructure which is more open to stakeholder involvement and 
empowerment (see Fig 2). The Confucian values of harmony and conflict avoidance are often 
an opposing force to the drive for stakeholder empowerment. 
 
 
 
Figure  2: Comparison of Three National Cultures 
 
This having been said, there is evidence from the case studies that a culture change is taking 
place. A move away from traditional procurement forms is now underway with the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority leading the way and the Works Bureau departments commencing a range 
of “experiments” with more open procurement forms. Indeed, the incorporation of partnering 
type agreements into many projects has contributed to a change in culture and lead to more 
open attitude to cooperation and collaboration in construction projects (see, for example, 
Anvuur, 2008). In line with this there needs to be a recognition that performance measures 
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need to be refocused to take into account medium and long term objectives in line with the 
arguments put forward by Walker et al. (2008). 
 
In recent years, employees and stakeholders have become much more aware of the need for 
firms and government to show a commitment to corporate social responsibility (see 
Rowlinson in Murray & Dainty, 2008) and this has raised awareness in all sectors. Indeed, 
major infrastructure and property developers have taken on board stakeholder management 
as part of their corporate social responsibility commitment; time will tell whether this is a 
marketing fad or a genuine culture change in the industry.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
For further progress to be made in stakeholder management the Hong Kong real estate and 
construction industry needs to address the following issues. 
 
Relationship management is not a panacea; it is not suitable for all kinds of project.  However 
it should be a major consideration in choosing project delivery process and cannot be bolted 
on to existing project delivery strategies in a piecemeal manner. Resistance to alliance 
contracting exists through the industry due to “it isn’t the way we do things” and a lack of trust 
– there is an industry wide issue on change of culture and development of real team.  
Relationship management is a sustainable approach to the industry in terms of people, 
environment and economics, help to satisfy client and stakeholder interests.  Communication 
is a key issue; integrated communication technology (ICT) can be a facilitator for these 
changes. 
 
Relationship management will not succeed unless it is implemented at all levels in the project.  
Relationship management must be continuously facilitated and maintained; it is NOT a one off 
process.  There are certain projects which do not require relationship management, but it 
should be considered while choosing project delivery process.  The question on whether 
relationship management should be applied to smaller projects has been a concern.  The 
concept of relationship management should be promoted and certain relationship 
management components can still be applied in smaller projects such as a half day 
foundation workshop instead of a one to two days workshop and a shorter list of items for 
scoring during monthly meetings.  Also, one should bear in mind that there are many 
examples of relationship management leading to successful projects, but it is not necessarily 
dispute free. 
 
Relationship management is all about people.  Individuals need to be educated and trained to 
provide essential skills for relationship management.  Facilitation is essential to break down 
barriers and to enable blame-free and open communication.  Facilitation should be a 
continuous process.  Relationship management and novel PDS lead to new roles which must 
be recognised and defined – people must be empowered to play these roles.  Informal 
communication is essential for relationship management but needs to be undertaken in an 
appropriately structure environment with appropriate procedures.  Not everyone is suited to 
relationship management – this is a human resources issue which needs to address when 
employing and choosing the right team members: should relationship management be part of 
job specification? 
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